Events

It is well known that the aesthetic is, so to speak, compromised with perception at least since the term was coined from the Greek aisthesis. Nevertheless, this does not mean that philosophical aesthetics coincides with a pure and simple doctrine of perception. Usually this distinction is made while presuming a class of special perceptual facts that would have different properties from ordinary perceptual facts. Contrariwise I think that this divergence should be ascribed to different managements of the same operativity of the perceptual praxis. It would hence consist in the ways through which something that appears in perception works, namely in its usages. In order to explain this hypothesis I believe we need to start by restoring the dimension of appearance in its rich phenomenology. More in general, this inquiry seems to imply a paradigm which is irreducible to the canonical, dualistic and restrictively cognitivist model, which is usually adopted in the analyses of the different modalities of human experience. In this way it seems to surface the possible relationship between aesthetic investigation and the analysis of the so-called “extended mind”.